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Abstract
The paper presents a game-theoretic model in order to investigate to
what extent an employee privatization program of a State owned rm can
be feasible under certain assumptions concerning the players' objective
functions and the market structure in which the rm operates. The public
managers are assumed interested in the rm's value, while the workers aim
at maximizing the per capita surplus over the wage. The privatization
process is then described as a bargaining process between the government
in the role of core investor in the rm's physical assets and the workers of
the rm, whose only asset is their personal skill. In the model the market
structure in which the rm sells its product is assumed to be imperfectly
competitive. After presenting the case of a monopolistic rm, the paper
explores what happens if the rm plays a duopoly quantity game. The
nal section is devoted to introducing to the analysis an x-eciency cost
proportional to the public share of the ownership. (JEL: C7, D23, L22,
L33, J54)
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1 Introduction
Recent theoretical and institutional contributions on the topic of privatization
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) stress the importance of decentralized,
rather than centrally controlled and discretionary, types of privatization (Bo-
getic (1991), Ben-ner (1993), Pejovich (1993)).1 The transfer of the rm's owner-
ship from the state to managers and employees, through a negotiated purchase,
seems to meet these requirements (Estrin (1991), Ben-ner (1993)). Employee
ownership is advocated to allow a somewhat immediate break with government
control and an eective governance structure during the transition period (My-
gind (1992), Bogetic and Conte (1992)). Another valuable feature is that its
implementation does not necessitate a stock exchange in order to allocate the
rm's shares and nd domestic or foreign funds.2 Factors against employee
privatization schemes include the possibility of reduced investment in physical
assets (Blanchard et al.(1991) and Tirole (1991)) and the implicit inequality
in the free-transfer version (as compared to the laveraged employee buyouts
that also appear to be equitable). At worst then, employee privatization can
be seen, particularly for CEE countries, as an intermediate step toward a more
complete privatization program (Earle and Estrin (1994)) or, alternatively, as a
temporary device to preserve employment.3
Obviously, several questions arise: when can this kind of transition process
actually be performed freely and when should it be enforced by the political
authorities? What are the eects of the economic environment on changes in
the rm's property rights and vice versa of dierent property rights allocations
on economic performance?
Two major factors are usually indicated as making an employee privatization
more likely to be proposed by public rms' employees to institutional authorities.
Firstly, the employees' desire to preserve their workplace when this is jeopar-
dized by a restructuring plan; secondly, particularly under a very low wage rate,
the employees' interest in obtaining a higher share of the rm's surplus, includ-
ing senior workers' human capital investments, which could be wasted under
alternative privatization plans. The model presented in this paper mainly deals
1For a taxonomy of alternative privatization processes, see among the others, Chilosi
(1993). Descriptions of decentralized privatization processes in CEE countries can be found,
for instance, in Bokros (1990), Voszka (1994), Grossfeld and Hare (1991) and Johnson-Kroll
(1993), respectively for Hungary, Poland and Russia.
2For more details on employee privatization schemes see also Ellerman (1990), Estrin
(1994), Weitzman (1991) and Weisskopf (1992).
3The Western industrial economies have recently witnessed a growing number of public
or private company take-overs by employees, usually originated when enterprises are facing
impending bankruptcy. For a survey, see Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993).
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with the second of these two factors.4 The employees' concern in the acquisition
of a public rm is modeled as a direct interest in the post-privatization distri-
bution of rm's decision power and surplus. Consequently, the negotiation for
the privatization of a previously state-owned rm is described as a bargaining
process between the government in the role of core investor in the rm's physical
assets, and the workers, whose only asset is their personal skill.5 The aim of
the government is assumed to be that of maximizing the prot and thus the
value of the rm.6 The workers' objective, conversely, is that of maximizing
the quasi-rent over a given market wage. The allocation of the rm's property
rights between the workers and the government is modelled as a cooperative
bargaining process between these two dierent players. The division of the pie,
the rm's property rights and the players' decision power are assumed closely
linked so that, when the players bargain on the pie division, they simultaneously
decide the rm's ownership structure and the decision power associated with it.
There are several applications of the internal bargaining approach to the
question of the organizational form of the rm.7 Specic models of companies
newly privatized as a result of contractual negotiations between a core (public
or private) investor and the workers as a group are presented in Bos (1991),
Rossini and Scarpa (1991), Bonin (1992). The main innovations of the present
work are both the introduction of an assets specicity in the negotiation and
the analysis of the bargaining game under dierent market structures.
In the present model the environment in which the rm sells its product is
assumed to be imperfectly competitive. After presenting the monopoly case,
the paper explores what happens if the contractual rm plays a duopoly quan-
tity game. Two cases are analyzed: in the rst the market competitor of the
contractual rm is assumed to be a prot maximizing rm, while in the second
the competitor is a labour-managed rm. In both cases the contractual rm is
assumed to be leader of a Stackelberg game, while the competitor plays the role
of follower.8 A result obtained is that dierences in market structures and in
4The appendix briey presents a dierent specication of the model that takes into account
the employees' interest in preserving a high level of employment.
5The public owner of the physical assets - the State or a national investment fund - taken
to be nancially committed to the rm, can be assumed to be represented by public managers
during the negotiation process. Informational problems among the principal (the government)
and the agents (the managers) are not taken into account in the present model. A nal section
of the paper, however, is devoted to introduce an x-ineciency in the analysis, that can be
interpreted as an imperfection in the agents' behaviour due to a lack of correct incentives in
the public rm.
6In a static analysis the prot of the rm coincides with the value of its shares at the end
of the production period.
7For a summary of the theoretical literature, see Aoki (1984) and Bonin and Putterman
(1987). A model that focusses on rm property rights determination in a bargaining perspec-
tive is presented in Dow (1993).
8Here the purpose is to describe two possible scenarios of Central and Eastern European
countries' market competition in which the public rm plays a dominant role.
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the type of competitor aect the bargaining solution by changing the payo the
rm obtains in the market.
Finally the model introduces an x-ineciency cost the rm bears during the
production process assumed to vary with the ownership arrangement decided
at the contractual stage of the analysis. The assumption is that this cost is
proportional to the nal share of ownership detained by the government.9
Before characterizing the formal structure of the analysis a note of caution
is needed on how to interpret the results of the model. In what follows, the
assumptions regarding the behaviour of the agents participating in the bargain-
ing game are abstracted from legal constraints that, diering in each country,
might drastically aect the formal results of the analysis. The purpose of the
paper is therefore that of studying, through a very stylized framework, some
of the formal conditions under which an employee-privatization process in CEE
countries could arise as a result of a cooperative negotiation between workers
and institutional owners of the rm.
Section 2 introduces the model, while section 3 presents the main ndings of
the analysis. Section 4 describes some results obtained by applying the model
respectively to monopoly and duopoly types of market structure. Section 5 is
devoted to introducing an x-eciency cost in the model. Section 6 discusses
and concludes the paper.
2 The model
The aim of this section is to model the privatization of a public rm as a co-
operative game. The two parties (workers and public investor) are assumed to
negotiate over the rm's ownership structure. In this simplied framework, the
ownership confers the right to take the relevant rm's decisions and specically
the right to chose the quantity to deliver in the market. The rm's ownership
also aects how the rm's prot (or loss) is divided between players once the
product is sold in the market. The main concern of this analysis is thus how
these two major rm's decisions interact: which results can be obtained when
the privatization decision (that is an ownership distribution decision) and the
market decision are jointly considered.
The use of the Nash 's cooperative solution seems to be sensible to model
the purposes of the CEE governments in adopting the massive privatization
plans. The objective of the privatization is both to maximize the production
surplus of the rms, making them protable, and to hold the value of the rm
positive. For the workers the objective is to increase their remuneration by
9An exogenous x-ineciency cost for the public rms is assumed, for instance, in Selten
(1986). This assumption though presented in a 'reduced form', represents the absence of
correct managerial incentives under public ownership as compared with a private self-managed
form of rm's ownership.
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extracting a share of the total surplus even when this implies becoming partial
or complete owners of the rm. It is assumed here that the chance of becoming
owners increases in accordance which each party's initial commitment to the
rm, measured by the level of investments at the beginning of the game that
aects each party's reservation payos in case of negotiation fallback. This
feature enables the model to represent the rm's nal ownership as dependent
on the nature of previous accumulation of human and physical assets by each
group of negotiators.
2.1 The bargaining game
Bargaining takes place between two dierent players within the rm: the em-
ployees (i = ` ) and the physical asset investor, the government, ( i = k ). Both
these players are assumed committed to the rm, since they made an investment
Ii, (i = `; k) before the bargaining game.
10 This investment could be thought
of as an expenditure on specialized job training for the workers, andas a xed
cost associated with the factory for the government. Let I =
Pk
i=l Ii denote
the total investment in physical and human assets and let the investment of the
two coalitions be sunk at a certain degree i, (i = `; k), i 2 [0; 1]. The value
of i is assumed to represent the degree to which each investment is specic to
the rm.11
The solution concept used to solve the bargaining game is the Nash cooper-
ative equilibrium, where the two parties are assumed to maximize the product
of their incremental utilities, i.e. the utilities obtained over their respective
reservation utilities (i.e. what they obtain in case of negotiation failure). Let
us characterize the nature of these utilities.
Following Ward's (1958) tradition, it is assumed that the utility of the work-
ers' coalition is exactly represented by the value added per worker. This means
that the workers have a preference for an egalitarian distribution of the surplus
amongst members of the workers' coalition, once the value of physical and hu-
man investment is repaid.12 In fact, the per capita value-added can be written
as:
U` (V (L)) =
p (Q (L))Q (L) Pki=l Ii
L
(1)
10In the present analysis the rm's decision to enter the market and the players' invest-
ments decisions are assumed given at the beginning of the game. An analysis of players' ex
ante investment decisions for the determination of the rm's property rights is contained, for
instance, in Hart and Moore (1990). An extended game-theoretic treatment of the strategic
xed cost choice for value-added maximizing and prot maximizing rms can be found in
Neary and Ulph (1994).
11We refer to the specicity of an asset for a contractual relationship between two intra-rm
coalitions in the sense of Klein and al. (1978) and Williamson (1985).
12If the workers become owners of the rm, they have to repay the government's investment.
The type of employee ownership scheme represented here is thus not one of free transfer but
an internally-nanced employee buyout.
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where L is the number of workers sharing the rm's surplus, p(Q) is an in-
verse demand curve assumed twice dierentiable with respect to the output Q
and downward sloping, and Ik is the physical rm's investment. Moreover, in
what follows, let us assume for simplicity that the rm produces the output Q
with a short-run technology using only labour Q (L) = L, and the investment
I =
Pk
i=l Ii. The expression (1) represents what the workers would maximize
in the case in which the government was excluded by the rm's decision process
after its complete privatization. Note also that for the workers, aiming at max-
imizing (1) is like maximizing Ul (V (L)) = w + (L)=L, where w is the given
market wage and (L) is the prot gained by the rm in the market. What the
workers bargain, therefore, is the net surplus over the given market wage.13
The utility of the government, conversely, can be represented by the value
and thus by the prot of the rm, i.e. the total revenue once a given wage w
for each worker and the total xed costs I are repaid:14
Uk ( (Q)) = p (Q)Q  wQ 
kX
i=l
Ii (2)
The dierent formalization of the two coalitions' utilities is related to the
dierent possible outcomes of the negotiation. Let  and (1   ) be the nal
weights given by the two coalitions respectively to (1) and (2) during the bar-
gaining game. If the public investor prevails in the bargaining game and the
weight given to the prot maximization is one, he is able to maximize the rm's
value over its physical assets. If this weight is zero, the rm will be identical to
a per capita value-added maximizing rm, and all the rent over the xed cost
will be equally shared among workers. Moreover, if  2 [0; 1], the surplus can
be expected to be distributed between the two players, according to the value
of .
In modelling the symmetric Nash cooperative equilibrium, the two parties
are assumed to have reservation utilities - i.e. the payos they receive in case of
negotiation failure - dierent from zero.15 The failure of the negotiation means
here that every agreement on how to distribute the ownership and the surplus
among the players has been unsuccessful. Let us dene the reservation utilities
respectively, as:
13A comprehensive treatment of labour-managed rms' behaviour can be found, for instance,
in Vanek (1970) and Bonin and Putterman (1987).
14Note that the public rm is not assumed to remunerate the human capital investment.
This is why the workers are relatively interested in the rm's privatization.
15For this standard interpretation of the threat point see, for instance, Binmore et al. (1986).
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
U ` = w +
(1  `) I`
L
; Uk = (1  k) Ik

(3)
where w is the market wage, while L is a given xed number of workers
participating at the negotiation.
With this modelling of the disagreement point as d =
 
U `; Uk

, there are
two dierent assumptions:
i) Only non-marginal workers participate in the bargaining game, that is,
the workers that certainly would nd a job in the market in case of negotiation
breakdown. They would obtain a given wage w plus an amount over the wage
equal to the non rm-specic part of their investment, i.e. that tradable in the
market;16
ii) In the case of negotiation failure, the asset investor can sell in the market
only the non specic and tradable part of his investment (1  k) Ik, while there
is no positive reservation prot on his asset.
The government's reservation utility in (3) simply describes the public in-
vestor's necessity to reach an agreement with the workers, that is, the unavail-
ability of alternative private investors. The choices available to the government
are thus those of either holding the rm public, or proceeding with an employee
privatization, or at worst, selling the rm's physical asset. The table 2 shows the
rm's objective and the players'payo in the extremes cases of the bargaining.
Cases Objectives Gov.'s Payo Work.'s Payo
Public Firm Uk((Q)) Ik+(P Q wQ I` Ik) w+ I`Q
Employee-Priv. U`(V (Q)) Ik w+ I`Q+
(PQ wQ Ik)
Q
Bargaining Failure - (1 k)Ik w+(1 `)I`
Q
Tab.2.1 - Objectives adopted and Players payos in the dierent
cases.
Now let us characterize the maximization problem the rm faces during
the negotiation. As described above, what the two bargaining parties aim at
maximizing are the relative incremental utilities that they can obtain by partic-
ipating in the production process of the rm. We want to assume here that this
surplus depends critically on the nal allocation of the rm's ownership, since
the latter aects the decision power of the rm and then the quantity oered in
the market, via the nal objective function of the rm. If  2 [0; 1] indicates the
ownership distribution between the two coalitions, ( = 1 if the ownership is in
16Note that the specic investment in human capital is assumed to be equal for each worker.
Note also that we have implicitly assumed a market wage that does not take into account
the specic value of the workers' job training. This is equal to assume a labour market
imperfection, as due, for instance, to imperfect workers' mobility.
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the hands of the government and  = 0 if the ownership is equally distributed
among the workers), the two parties solve the following problem:
Max

N (Q ()) =
 
Uk ( (Q ()))  Uk
   U` (V (Q ()))  U `
s:t:  2 [0; 1] ; Ui  U i, (i = `; k)
where Ui (i = `; k) depends on  (Q)and V (Q) ; respectively prot and per
worker value added, that are the corresponding objective functions of the two
coalitions. These two functions depend on the ownership distribution  through
the quantity (and then the labour) the rm selects in equilibrium. In this way
the players select the ownership distribution  in an indirect way, by taking into
account the corresponding eect of  on the output oered in the market.
Before deriving the rst order conditions of the problem (4), we must be
sure that always, at an optimal value of , the disagreement point lies inside the
set of the permissible outcomes, that is, Ui  U i, (i = `; k) : In order to respect
this constraint, it is sucient to assume an interval for I =
P`
i=k Ii, I 2
 
0; I

,
where:(
I j 8i 2 [0; 1] and 8` 2 [0; 1) ;8k 2 (0; 1] ,
X`
i=k
i = 1; Ui  U i; (i = `; k)
)
where i is the degree of specicity of assets, while i is the share of total
investment borne by type of each player. From the formalization of the reserva-
tion utilities (3), it is possible to derive this interval for I as I 2

0; Q(P (Q) w)2
i
.
Note also that within this interval , (Q)  0; and V (Q)  w > 0.17
Now, by constructing the Lagrangian function of the problem (4)18, we have
the following rst order conditions for an interior solution ( 2 (0; 1)):19
 
Uk ( (Q ()))  Uk
 
U` (V (Q ()))  U `
 =  @  Uk ( (Q ()))  Uk =@Q
@
 
U` (V (Q ()))  U `

=@Q
(4)
17The conditions introduced make sure that the rm's xed cost is never equal to zero
otherwise for a pure labour-managed rm the equilibrium quantity decision is trivially satised
(Q = 0), (see, for instance, Cremer and Cremer (1992)). Moreover, when the prot obtained
by the rm goes to zero there is no more dierence between the behaviour of labour-managed
and prot maximizing rms (see, for instance, Dreze (1989)).
18See, for details, the appendix .
19The value of dQ
d
, is always positive (see lemma 1) and can be ruled out by the expression
(5).
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This is a standard result for which, at the interior bargaining solution point,
the elasticity of substitution of the net utilities of the two coalitions is equal to
their relative contractual power (here, assuming players' symmetry the bargain-
ing power ratio is equal to one), adjusted for the strict concavity of the utility
frontier (depending here by the assumption on the demand function).20
Before giving a consistent interpretation of the expressions obtained above,
we need to assume a given relationship between the rm's output Q and the
ownership distribution . What it is required is a function Q () : [0; 1] ! <+.
It is then necessary to analyze the behavior of the rm in the product market.
2.2 The market game
Let us start this section by characterizing the generic objective function adopted
by the rm in the market. The most obvious way to proceed is by building this
function as a linear combination of the two negotiators' objective functions (1)
and (2), with corresponding weights  and (1  ):
 (Q; ) =   Uk ( (Q)) + (1  )  U` (V (Q)) (5)
In the above formulation, the distribution of the rm's ownership  and
(1 ), respectively to the public investor and the workers, cooperatively decided
according to (4), is assumed to have a direct impact on the rm's decision-
making process in the product market. A basic way to look at the expression
(6) is that the two coalitions jointly delegate a manager to decide the production
level of the rm. This manager simply maximizes the utility functions of the
coalitions with respect to the quantity, according to the weight  decided during
the cooperative stage of the analysis. The problem solved by the manager is,
thus:
Max
Q2[0;1)
 (Q; ) =   Uk ( (Q)) + (1  )  U` (V (Q)) (6)
whose rst order condition is simply given by:21
@Uk ( (Q)) =@Q
@U` (V (Q)) =@Q
=   (1  )

(7)
The meaning of the expression (8) is that the rm's objective function is
maximized when the ratio between marginal contributions of the specic ob-
jective functions is equal to the ratio between shares of ownership detained by
20For this result see, for instance, Svejnar (1982).
21Second order conditions are met by the strict concavity of  (Q)and V (Q) and of their
linear combination (6).
9
each player.
Now we present a lemma that syntethizes some comparative statics results rel-
evant for the following analysis.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium quantity is always increased by an increase of the
share of public ownership , within the interval  2 [0; 1], and by an increase of
the level of physical asset investment Ik within the interval  2 [0; 1).
Proof. Totally dierentiating the expression (8), the following result is ob-
tained:
dQ
d
=   @S=@
@S=@Q
where S is the entire expression (8), treated as an implicit function of Q
and . Since second order condition is met (see footnote 19), the sign of the
RHS denominator is negative and all the RHS expression has the sign of its
numerator. Thus:
Si gn
dQ
d
= Si gn
@S
@
= Si gn

@Uk ( (Q
))
@Q
  @U` (V (Q
))
@Q

Now, we need to prove that for  2 (0; 1) ; @Uk((Q))@Q > 0 and @U`(V (Q
))
@Q < 0;
while for  = 0, @Uk((Q
))
@Q > 0 ,
@U`(V (Q
))
@Q = 0; and for  = 1 ,
@Uk((Q
))
@Q = 0
, @U`(V (Q
))
@Q < 0:
Let us assume rst that  2 (0; 1). Since in this case  and (1 ) are greater
than zero, the left hand side of expression (8) is lesser than zero. This means,
that:
Si gn
@Uk ( (Q
))
@Q
6= Si gn @U` (V (Q
))
@Q
Since U` (V (Q
)) = Uk((Q
))
Q +w it ensues that
@U`(V (Q
))
@Q =
Uk()QQ Uk()
Q2 ,
where the subscripts indicates the derivative. For Q > 0 the denominator of
the expression is positive while observing the numerator it turns out that, if
@Uk((Q
))
@Q < 0, also
@U`(V (Q
))
@Q < 0 (since Uk ( (Q
))  0 as far as I 2  0; I).
But this contradicts the condition that imposes dierent signs for the two ex-
pressions at the equlibrium quantity. Thus, when 0 <  < 1, @Uk((Q
))
@Q > 0,
and @U`(V (Q
))
@Q < 0. Now, let us consider the case for  = 0. From the ex-
pression (8) we know that when  = 0 then @U`(V (Q
))
@Q = 0. From the fact that
@U`(V (Q
))
@Q =
Uk()QQ Uk()
Q2 it ensues (since Uk ( (Q
))  0) that @Uk((Q))@Q >
0. Finally, for  = 1, and @Uk((Q
))
@Q = 0; from the same expression we derive
that @U`(V (Q
))
@Q < 0.
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The second part of the lemma, concerning with a change of Ik, is straight-
forward. Totally dierentiating the expression (8) we obtain:
Si gn
dQ
dIk
= Si gn
@S
@Ik
= Si gn


@2Uk ( (Q
; Ik))
@Q@Ik
+ (1  ) @
2U` (V (Q
; Ik))
@Q@Ik

Using (1) and (2) we notice that@
2Uk((Q
;Ik))
@Q@Ik
= 0 and @
2U`(V (Q
;Ik))
@Q@Ik
> 0.
Thus, whithin the interval  2 [0; 1), the sign of dQdIk is positive. (Q.E.D.)
The results of the lemma are very intuitive. Firstly, increasing  at the
quantity equilibrium point always raises the output, since this increases the
weight of the prot function whose derivative is greater or equal to zero and
decreases the weight of the value added function, whose derivative is lesser or
equal to zero (and they are never both equal to zero). The function Q () :
[0; 1] ! <+ is, in fact, monotonically increasing in . This result is due to the
well known output restrictivity of a per worker value-added maximizing rm
(VMF) as compared to a prot maximizing rm (PMF) (Ward (1958)).22 In
the present framework the lemma 1 underlines how in the case of complete or
partial employee-privatization the workers' interest in maximizing the per capita
utility determines a reduction of the rm's output. The size of this eect can
partially be compensated by a high level of rm's physical asset Ik. Also this
result is due to the peculiar objective function of a VMF: when the xed cost
Ik increases, the VMF reacts by raising the number of workers and, from here,
the output produced.
This representation of the of the employee-managed rm's market behavior
stresses two simple facts. On the one hand, since each worker aims at maxi-
mizing his individual value added, a partial or complete employee privatization
gives rise to an output restriction as compared with the quantity produced when
the rm is public. This feature is included in the model in order to characterize
an employee owned rm as having an interest in individual rather than total
prot. On the other hand, only the need of repaying a relevant xed cost pushes
rational workers towards higher production levels, with the purpose of sharing
its burden among a high number of workers.23
In what follows, we rstly present some general results which hold true in
every market structure. Secondly we compare, simply assuming a linear demand
function, the rm's behaviour under monopoly and mixed duopoly types of
market. Finally, we present the most meaningful eects raised in the model by
the introduction of a rm's internal costs.
22We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.The result, however, would also hold
with more traditional specications of government and workers' utility. See the appendix for
a dierent treatment of players' objective functions.
23Under a higher Ik , however, it will be more dicult in general for the workers to raise a
sucient cash ow to repay the physical asset and enable the employee privatization.
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3 The privatization and the market game
In this section we rst state some general results obtained by considering the
players' behaviour in the complete game. Bargaining and market decisions are
simultaneously taken into account. A rst result is concerned with the two
extreme cases of complete employee privatization and of a fully public rm.
Proposition 1 (a) In equilibrium all the ownership can be in the hands of
workers' coalition ( = 0) only when
 
U`   U `

; that is, when each worker
accepts a payo equal to his reservation utility. (b) Analogously, in equilibrium,
all the ownership can be in the hands of the government ( = 1) only when 
Uk   Uk

; that is, when the rm's value is equal to the tradable value of the
rm's physical assets.
Proof. (See appendix).
What the above proposition states, in eect, is that in order to obtain all the
rm's ownership the players have to renounce all the surplus over their reser-
vation utility. This can happen when the level of Ii is high enough to make a
coalition's incremental utility equal to zero. The workers or investor's commit-
ment in term of their investment has to be high enough to make them indierent
between negotiating or accepting the disagreement point. Thus, under the as-
sumptions of the model a complete employee privatization is excluded, because
the product of players' net utilities can never be maximized when one of the
two is equal to zero. This result, depending on the nature of the cooperative
solution, can be restated dierently by excluding the extrema of the interval for
 and considering a public rm privatized when  = (0 + "), and completely
public when  = (1  "), where " is an arbitrarily small number. In this way it
remains true that when for instance the workers made a very high investment
Il in job training they are entitled to become owners of the rm (
 = (0 + ")),
since the bargaining solution maximizes the net incremental utilities product
when  is close to zero. Similarly, when the government net gain from bargain-
ing is very low because of the high physical asset cost Ik, the government will
not be keen to privatize, preferring to mantain the rm public ( = (1  ")).
The next group of results is obtained by handling the simple comparative
statics of the complete game at an interior solution point. It holds, with dierent
intensities, for every assumed f irm's market structure. The proofs of these
results, mainly rely on the lemma 1.
Proposition 2 a) If the rm's physical asset Ik owned at the beginning of the
game by the government changes, while I =
P`
i=k Ii belongs to the interval 
0; I

; the equilibrium value for  changes in the same direction, that is, if Ik
increases thus  ! 1; b) A variation of w; the current market wage, determines
a change in the same direction of , that is, if w increases thus  ! 1;
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c) Changes on each player's specicity of investment i; inversely aect their
possibility to be rm's owners, that is, if ` increase, for a given I` , 
 ! 1;while
if k increase, for a given Ik; thus 
 ! 0:
Proof.
Firstly, an internal solution for  is derived by using the two rst order
conditions (5) and (8):
 =
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `
 
U` (V (Q))  U `

+
 
Uk ( (Q))  Uk
 : (8)
All the results of the proposition can be obtained by totally dierentiating
the expression (9) in the text by Ik, w and i (i = l; k) :
Result (a): by treating  as a function of Ik,  (Q (Ik) ; Ik), for  2
(0; 1), we obtain:
d(Q(Ik);Ik)
dIk
=
VIk(Uk((Q)) Uk) Ik (U`(V (Q)) U`)+(U`(V (Q)) U`)
((Uk((Q)) Uk)+(U`(V (Q)) U`))2
(9)
where the subscripts indicate derivatives. We need to prove that the above
expression is positive. The denominator is positive while also the numerator is
positive since the third term of the (10) is greater than zero for  2 (0; 1) , while
VIk and Ik are lesser than zero with jVIkj < jIkj and
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk

< 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

when Ik starts to increase.
Result (b):by treating  as a function of w,  (Q (w) ; w) ; we obtain:
d(Q(w);w)
dw =
(VQQw 1)(Uk((Q)) Uk) (QQw Q)(U`(V (Q)) U`)
((Ul(V (Q)) U l)+(U`(V (Q)) U`))2
(10)
The numerator of the expression is positive for the following reasons:
i) VQ < 0 (see proof of lemma 1) and sign of Q

w = sign of   < 0 for
 2 (0; 1) so VQ Qw > 0 and VQ Qw
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk

> 0 in the rst term;
ii) Q
 
Ul (V (Q
))  U l

>
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk

since Q > L;
iii) Q Qw
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

< 0; since Q > 0 (see proof of lemma 1) and
Qw < 0: Thus
  Q Qw
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

at the numerator is positive.
Result (c):Following again the same procedure, we have:
d
d`
=
I`
L (Uk((Q)) Uk)
((U`(V (Q)) U`)+(Uk((Q)) Uk))2
> 0 (11)
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and,
d
dk
=
 Ik(Uk((Q)) Uk)
((Ul(V (Q)) U l)+(Uk((Q)) Uk))2
< 0 (12)
(Q.E.D.)
Looking at the expression (9) the nature of the nal decision taken coop-
eratively by the two representative players becomes clear. When the surplus
of each worker is close to zero - due for instance to a high worker investment
I` - and the rm's value is positive, the employee privatization is possible be-
cause while the government is available to privatize to obtain a positive rm's
surplus, the workers are open to the possibility of becoming owners in order to
get something more, however small, over the market wage and their investment
in job training. Alternatively, when the rm's value over its reservation value
is close to zero, it does not make sense for the government to privatize, so he
will keep the ownership and the control of the rm public. Equal shares of sur-
plus,
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

=
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk

; from (9) give rise to an equal
ownership distribution ( = 12 ).
All the results of proposition 2 are obtained by the comparative statics of
the expression (9).
The result a) comes from the fact that an increase of Ik increases the reser-
vation utility of the government and reduces both U` (V (Q
)) and Uk ( (Q)).
The total eect is that the complete acquisition of the rm becomes more expen-
sive and thus more dicult for the workers and at the margin the privatization
is less convenient for the government with respect to the rm's reservation value.
One way to explain the result c) is by saying that an increase of w has rela-
tively no eect on workers' reservation utility24 but reduces both U` (V (Q
))and
Uk ( (Q
)) ; (the latter proportionally more since w is multiplied by Q), so the
nal eect is mainly that the workers have a more decisive tendence to remain
employees and the government to have a more complete control over the rm.
The result c) is even more intuitive: an increase in the players' investment
specicity reduces their reservation utilty and then reduces their share of own-
ership cooperatively decided through the bargaining game. The idea is that a
high specic investment makes the parties less keen to risk a breakdown of the
negotiation and thus more disposed to mantain the status quo.
To conclude, the main information conveyed by the proposition is that an
employee privatization yielded by a government-employees negotiation is more
likely to arise under a low level of the rm's physical assets, a low level of the
market wage and a not too specic investment in job training (even if a large
24Since
 
Ul   U l

= w + 
Q
  w   (1 l)Il
L =

Q
  (1 l)Il
L , a variation of market wage w
has an eect on Ul but not on U l:
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investment in job training I` makes the employee privatization relatively more
possible).
4 Employee privatization under dierent mar-
ket structures
The present section is principally devoted to analysing how dierent market
structures can aect the bargaining game and then the possibility of an employee
privatization taking place through a bilateral negotiation among players. For the
sake of tractability and comparability of the results some simpling assumptions
are required.25 The rst assumption is the linearity of the demand function:
p (Q) = a Q (13)
where a is the usual parameter expressing the market size, such that a > w;
and Q is the total quantity of product delivered in the market.
The second simplifying assumption requires the symmetry of players' invest-
ments, Il = Ik = Ii and of their relative specicity i, assumed to be equal for
both the parties, l = k = : Finally, the number of workers admitted to bar-
gaining with the government is always assumed to coincide with the equilibrium
number of employees, such that L = L = Q. This set of assumptions allows
us to obtain a relatively simple analitical solution to the problem.
Note that when the rm is monopolistic there is no need to change any fea-
ture of the model. For the duopolistic case, we consider two dierent scenarios.
Firstly we assume that the bargaining rm's competitor is a traditional prot
maximizing rm, while, in a second case, the competitor rm is assumed to
be a pure per worker value-added maximizing rm. The rms' objective func-
tions are reported below respectively for the case of the bargaining rm (always
labelled rm 1), the PMF competitor and the VMF:
1 (q1; q2) = 
  
a 
2X
i=1
qi
!
q1   wq1   Ik
!
+ (1  )
0BB@

a 
2P
i=1
qi

q1 Ik
q1
1CCA
2 (q1; q2) =
 
a 
2X
i=1
qi
!
q2   wq2   Ik
V2 (q1; q2) =

a 
2P
i=1
qi

q2 Ik
q2
25The main results hold, however, in a more general framework.
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where qi (i = 1; 2) is the output of each rm. Note that for simplicity the
level of physical asset required in the market to run a rm is assumed to be
the same for all types of rms and equal to Ik. Relegating in the appendix the
details about the application of the lemma 1 and of the bargaining game to
the duopolistic framework, we rstly report the results obtained for , q1 (
)
and q2 (q

1 (
)) in the three market structures considered (labelled M for the
monopoly, PM for the duopoly with a prot maximizing rm and VM for the
duopoly with a value added maximizing rm) by assuming that the contractual
rm plays as a leader in a Stackelberg game; secondly we summarize in a table
the threshold levels of investment Ii, wage w and specicity of investment 
such that goes respectively to zero and one.
Thus, for the monopoly the equilibrium quantity is:
QM () =
a  w   
2
(14)
where
 =
q
4Ii (   2) + (w   1)2
and the equilibrium ownership distribution is:
 =
 (w   a) + 2Ii (   3) + (w   a)2
 (2Ii   4Ii + w2   w) + 2Ii (2w      4w + a) + w (w   a) (15)
For the duopoly with a maximizing rm (PMF) the equilibrium values are:
qPM1 (
) =
a  w   
2
(16)
qPM2 (q

1 (
)) =
a  w + 
2
(17)
 =
 (w   a) + 2Ii (2   5) + (w   a)2
 (3Ii   6Ii + w2   w) + Ii (7w   3   14w + 4a) + w (w   a)2 (18)
where
 =
q
8Ii (   2) + (w   1)2
and nally for the duopoly with a per worker value-added maximizing rm
(VMF):
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qVM1 (
) =
a  w   
2
(19)
qVM2 (q

1 (
)) =
p
Ii (20)
 =
(
p
Ii+w a)+2Ii 5Ii+2
p
Ii(w a)+(w a)2
(Ii(2 3)+
p
Ii(2w 1)+w(w 1))+I
3
2
i
(4 7)+Ii(4w 2+5w)+
p
Ii(w a)(3w a)+w(w a)2
(21)
where
 =
q
Ii (4   7) + 2I
1
2
i (w   a) + (w   a)2
CASES MONOP. DUOP. (PM) DUOP.(VM)
Ii )  = 0 (w a)
2
( 3)2
(w a)2
(2 5)2
(w a)2
( 4)2
Ii )  = 1 (w a)
2
4(2 )
(w a)2
9(2 )
(w a)2(9 4) 4(w a)2p2 
4(2 )
w )  = 0 a pIi(3 ) a+2pIi(2 5) a+pIi( 4)
w )  = 1 a 2pIip2  a 3pIip2  a pIi 2pIip2 
 )  = 0 3 (a w)p
Ii
5
p
Ii+w a
2
p
Ii
4
p
Ii+w ap
Ii
 )  = 1 8Ii (a w)24Ii
18Ii (a w)2
9Ii
7Ii+2
p
a w (a w)2
4Ii
Tab. 5.1 Thresholds level of Ii; w and  for dierent market
structures.
A very straightforward computation of the threshold levels for Ii, w and
 in the dierent market structures, shows how the market environment in
which the contractual rm operates aects the results of the bargaining game.
There exists, in other words, a rank of the threshold levels associated with each
dierent market structure. This rank suggests that more competitive market
structures are associated with relatively lower possiblities that the employee
privatization takes place. The next proposition expresses this result.
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions of the model the levels of Ii, w and
 such that the rm's equilibrium ownership distribution implies a complete
( = 0) or quasi-complete employee privatization ( = 0 + ") are ranked in
the following way: IMi > I
VM
i > I
PM
i , w
M > wVM > wPM and M > VM >
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PM . Associating the degree of competition of a market structure with the to-
tal equilibrium quantity
 
QPM > QVM > QM

, it ensues that higher degrees
of market competition make less possible (when considered in terms of three-
shold level of the parameters) that the bargaining game leads to an employee
privatization of the rm.
Proof. See appendix.
The technical explanation of the above proposition is concerned with the
dierent impact that the investment, the wage and the asset specicity have on
the bargaining rm's equilibrium revenue. It is clear that the higher the level of
competition in the market is, the lower the equilibrium value of the revenue will
be. Consequently, the value of the government's net surplus
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk

is more sensitive to the value of the parameters the higher the degree of compe-
tition is. At the same time, because of the peculiar objective function assumed
for the workers, the value of the workers' surplus
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

, is less sen-
sitive to the value of parameters and thus to the degree of market competition.26
When interpreted strategically, what was stated before can be restated by saying
that quantity competition reduces the market output and induces the intra-rm
coalitions to cooperatively adopt a more aggressive attitude in the market. In a
duopolistic market rational players will usually prefer to adopt the prot maxi-
mization than the more restrictive per capita value added maximizing objective
function. From this point of view, giving a greater weight on the government's
objective function becomes a better option in duopoly than in monopoly as
compared with the individual prot maximization associated with the workers'
ownership.
5 X-ineciency and privatization
The next step of this paper is to consider how an internal cost borne by the
public rm, assumed to vary with the public share of rm's ownership, aects
the decision to privatize the rm. The reason for exploring this topic lies in the
often debated internal ineciency of public rms as compared with the possibly
higher internal eciency generally expected from the employee-owned rms.27
The point of interest is to analyse how this feature, exogenously introduced
26The dierent sensitivity of  and V with respect to a variation of Ik can be found,
for instance, in Neary and Ulph (1994). Note that when Ik rises I` rises as well (for the
assumption that Ik = I` ) reducing the impact on 
; the positive eect of Ik on  ,
however, prevails on the negative eect of I`:
27Surveys on public rms' performances are included, for instance, in Marchand, Pestieau
and Tulkens (1984), Bos (1991), Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Laont and Tirole (1993).
Though usually motivated by insucient monitor arrangements, sometimes the x-ineciency
of public rms is exogenously introduced as due to "managers' slackness" (see, for instance,
Selten (1986) and De Fraja (1991)). Here we follow this second route. For a review of the
labour managed rms performances literature see, for instance, Ireland and Law (1982).
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in the model, may aect the ownership distribution equilibrium studied above.
By simply assuming a given x-ineciency cost related to the public form of
ownership and variable with the rm's output,  =  ()Q; (0 > 0;  (0) = 0;
 (1) = ), we can observe which are the most immediate consequences for the
analysis.28
By including the x-ineciency cost into the expressions (4) and (6) and
computing the rst order conditions, the following expression for  ensues:
 =
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `
 
U` (V (Q))  U `

+
 
Uk ( (Q))  Q   Uk
 (22)
The eect of the x-ineciency cost  is thus mainly which to reduce the
rm's surplus when the ownership is public. By considering the value of  as
a function  (Q () ; ),  (q1 () ; q

2 () ; ) or 
 (q1 () ; q

2 ; )repectively in
the case of monopoly, duopoly with a PMF and duopoly with aVMF (in this
case the competitor's quantity is not aected by ), the expression (16) can be
totally dierentiated in order to obtain the result of the next proposition.
Proposition 4 The presence of an ineciency cost  =  ()Q related to the
public share of rm's ownership , taking the form of a variable cost with re-
spect to the output produced, makes an employee privatization more suitable
than under its absence ( < ) if the following conditions hold:
dQd  >Q + ddQ dQd  for the monopoly case, dq1d  + @@q1 q1q2 dq2d  > q + @@q1 dq1d  for
the duopoly with a PMF, and
dq1d  > q + @@q1 dq1d  for the duopoly with a
VMF.
Proof. See appendix.
The explanation of the result presented above relies on two opposite eects
raised by the presence of an x-ineciency cost: on the one hand, since this
cost is associated only with the public objective function, it reduces the govern-
ment's surplus of a magnitude

d
dQ
dQ
d

, making the government relatively less
disposed to the employee privatization as stated by the proposition 1; on the
other hand, the presence of the ineciency cost pushes the players toward the
choice of the objective function U` (V (Q
))because the reduction of the equilib-
rium quantity

dq1
d 

due to the ineciency cost requires a lower (see lemma
1). Under a duopolistic market structure and a PMF type of competitor, as far
as an analogous x-ineciency cost is assumed for this competitor (as due, for
instance, to the PMF managers' slackness similar to that assumed for the public
28In the appendix we suggest a very simple way to derive a specic functional form for this
internal cost.
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rm), the possibility that the ineciency cost induces an employee privatization
increases, with the relative advantage represented in the expression by the term
@
@q1
q1
q2
dq2
d

. Conversely, when there is a VMF as competitor, since this rm
does not bear the internal cost, the problem faced by the contractual rm is
quite similar to that observed in the monopolistic market.
Thus, what the proposition above shows is that the rm's reaction to the x-
ineciency cost related to the nal ownership distribution depends both on the
market structures and on the nature of the rm's competitors. When the mar-
ket is duopolistic and the competitor is a prot-maximizing rm, the presence of
an internal cost makes workers' ownership more suitable than under monopoly
or duopoly with a VMF. When interpreted as a comparative disadvantage, this
relative ineciency of a public rm makes an employee privatization plan ad-
vantageous in terms of the market share gains associated to the reduction of
costs.
6 Concluding remarks
About ten years ago the Employee Shares Ownership Schemes (ESOP's) be-
came popular in United States, United Kindom and other Western countries.
These schemes arose to save some rms from bankruptcy and their workforces
from losing their jobs and the specic skills they had acquired through working
within the rm for a long time. At that time this solution probably signied
an unusual change of attitude for countries in which employee ownership and
labour-managed rms represented an exception to the prevailing capitalistic
rms.
Central and Eastern European countries, conversely, have always been more
keen in workers' participation - though not in formal ownership - in rm's
decision-making. It is thus not so unnatural that, during the transition period,
when nationalized rms' privatization is a priority for the Eastern and Cen-
tral European countries, sometimes public rms' employees spontaneously elect
themselves as eligible to be the potential decision-makers and owners of newly
privatized rms. This process, of course, does not always appear as a rst-best
privatization procedure when the main problem of the public rms is that of
raising sucient physical assets and fresh nancial funds necessary to the rm's
survival and growth, especially when there are other nancial investors avail-
able. In many intermediate cases, however, for high labour-intensive medium
and small rms that are not particularly starving for capital and in absence
of available alternatives, employee privatization can be considered a concrete
option.
The model presented above, by representing the privatization as a bargain-
ing process between government and workers, underlines limits and advantages
of the employee-privatization of a public rm. A rst limit exists when rm's
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physical asset is very high. Two reasons, one concerning the rm's protabil-
ity and the other the rm's market strategy, represent possible limits to the
employee privatization. The nature of the model presented above matches the
often observed empirical evidence that employee-owned rms are more restric-
tive and smaller than the private rms. When the physical asset investment
inherited by the public rm is very high, the employee-privatized rm increases
the production in order to cover the xed costs and repay the rm's shares,
thus changing the rm's objective function from a pure value-added to a pure a
prot maximizing one. The strategic limit arises conversely when the rm faces
the market competition: the model shows that when there is a PMF competing
in the product market, the contractual rm has an advantage to behave as a
PMF, and this presumibly explains why the public rm may be refrained by
adopting a \democratic" ownership structure.
The model oers an opposite prediction when there is a high workers' tradable
human capital. Here, the employees have a great incentive to become rm's
owner in order to obtain a higher share of its surplus and moreover they have
more bargaining power during the negotiation process due to the higher reser-
vation wage (inclusive of the human tradable capital). This is more likely to
happen when the market competition is not very intense (ex. a monopoly) so
the dimension of the rm does not aect the market share and the rm's prof-
itability. When a high investment in human capital is associated with a relevant
x-ineciency of the public rm, as for instance in the presence of a high cost
of monitoring workers' and managers' shirking, and this problem is shared in
the market with other rms, the employee privatization oers an advantage,
assuming of course, that the members of an employee owned rm do not shirk.
A further indication of the model concerns the procedure of an employee pri-
vatization: there is an inherent diculty in obtaining a complete employee-
privatization through the bargaining process since the complete privatization in
a bargaining model raises as a corner solution and implies zero of workers' net
utility. This result can be interpreted by saying that in general, if the public
authorities do not enforce or give an incentive for an employee privatization
program, it may be dicult for players to obtain it by spontaneous negotiation.
A clear indication emerging however from the results of the model is that the
set of conditions required for a rm's employee privatization are more likely to
arise in Central and Eastern European countries than in theWestern European
ones, making more likely negotiated employee ownership privatizations in the
former rather than in the latter. It is not implausible, however, that in the
presence of a negative business cycle, low wages and low competition, Western
countries too may witness a growing rate of employee take-overs of liquidated
private and public rms.
21
References
[1] Aoki,M. (1984), The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press.
Ben-ner, A., (1993), "Organizational Reform In Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, a Comparative Perspective", Annals of Public and Cooperative Eco-
nomics, 2, 329-365.
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A. and Wolinsky, A. (1986), "The Nash Bar-
gaining Solution in Economic Modelling", Rand Journal of Economics, 2,
176-188.
Blanchard, O., Dornbusch, R., Krugman, P., Layard, R. and Summers L.
(1991), Reforms in Eastern Europe, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
Bogetic, Z. (1991), "The Role of Employee Ownership in Privatization of
State Enterprises in Eastern and Central Europe", Discussion Paper IDP-
0103, Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region, The World Bank,
Washington D.C..
Bogetic, Z. and Conte, M. (1992), "Privatizing Eastern European
Economies: A Critique", Working Paper.
Bokros, L., (1990), "Preliminary Experiences, Institutional Framework,
Strategies and Methods of Privatization in Hungary", Paper presented at
ICPE/EDI/UNDP Conference in Ljubliana, Novenber 1990.
Bonin, J.P. (1992), "Privatization and Ecient Contracts: The Work-
ers'Stake in The Transition", Journal of Comparative Economics, 16, 716-
732.
Bonin, J.P. Jones, D.C., Putterman, L. (1993), "Theoretical and Empirical
Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will The Twain Ever Meet", Journal of
Economic Literature, forthcoming.
Bonin, J.P. and Putterman (1987), Economics of Cooperation and the
Labor-Managed Economy, London, Harwood Academic Publishers.
Bos, D. (1987), "Privatization of Public Firms: A Government-Trade
Union-Shareholder Cooperative Game", Paper presented for the 43rd
Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Paris, 1987.
Bos, D. (1991), Privatisation: A Theoretical Treatment. Oxford, Oord
University Press.
Chilosi A. (1993), "Alternative Privatization Process and Their Economic
Consequences in Transitional Economies", Europa-Europe, 2 (3).
Cremer, H. and Cremer, J. (1992), "Duopoly with Employee-Controlled
and Prot Maximizing Firms: Bertrand vs Cournot Competition", Journal
of Comparative Economics, 16, 241-258.
22
De Fraja, G. (1991), "Eciency and Privatization in Imperfectly Compet-
itive Industries", Journal of Industrial Economics, 3, 311-321.
Dow, G. (1993), "Why Capital Hires Labor: A Bargaining Perspective",
American Economic Review, 1, 118-134.
Dreze, J., H.(1989), Labour Management, Contracts and Capital Markets.
A General Equilibrium Approach. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Ellerman, (1990), "Perestroika with Worker Ownership", Annals of Public
and Cooperative Economics, 4,519-535.
Estrin, S. (1991), "Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: What
Lesson Can be Learnt fo Western Experience", Annals of Public and Co-
operative Economics, 62, 159-182.
Estrin, S. (1994), Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, Longman.
Earle, J.S. and Estrin, S. (1994), "Workers Ownership in Transition",
mimeo.
Grossfeld, I. and Hare, P.,(1991), "Privatization in Hungary, Poland and
Czechoslovakia", mimeo, PHARE 2, Brussels, February 1991.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the
Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 98, 119-158.
Johnson, S. and Kroll, H. (1993), "Privatizations and Property Rights",
Europa-Europe, 2.
Ireland, N.J. and Law, P.J. (1982), The Economics of Labour-Managed
Enterprises. New York, St. Martin.
Klein, B., Crawford, R. and Alchian, A. (1978), "Vertical Integration, Ap-
propriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of
Laws and Economics, 21,297-326.
Laont J.-J. and Tirole J. (1993), A theory of Incentives in Procurement
and Regulation. Cambridge Mass., MIT Press.
Marchand, M., Pestieau, P. and Tulkens, H.eds. (1984), The Performance
of Public Enterprieses, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
Mygind (1992), "The Choice of Ownership Structure", Economic and In-
dustrial Democracy, 13, 359-399.
Neary, H.,M. and Ulph, D. (1994), "Strategic Investment and the Co-
existence of Labour-managed and Prot-maximizing Firms", Paper pre-
sented at the 7th IAFESM Conference, Portoroz, Slovenia, June 1994.
Pejovich, S. (1993), "A Property Analysis of Alternative Methods of Or-
ganizing Production", Paper Presented at the AISSEC Meeting in Milano,
September, 1993.
23
Rossini, G. and Scarpa (1991), "The Trasformation of a Labour-Managed
Monopoly: Competition Policy Vs Mixed Firms", Working Paper n.102
University of Bologna.
Selten, (1986), "Elementary Theory of Slack-ridden Imperfect Competi-
tion", in Stiglitz, J. and Mathewson eds. New Development in the Analysis
of Market Structure, London, Mac-Millan.
Svejnar, J. (1982), "On the theory of a Participatory Firm", Journal of
Economic Theory, 27, 313-330.
Tirole, J. (1991), "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and The
Economics of Transition", in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Cam-
bridge Mass. The MIT Press, 221-259.
Vanek, J. (1970), The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market
Economies, Ithaca N:Y:, Cornell University Press.
Voszka, E. (1993), "Spontaneous Privatization in Hungary", in Earle, J.,
Frydman, R., Rapaczynski, A., eds., Privatization in the Transition to a
Market Economy: Studies of Policies and Preconditions in Eastern Europe,
Pinter Publishers.
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1991), "Economic Perspectives on Privatiza-
tion", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 2, 111-132.
Ward, B. (1958), "The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndacalism", American
Economic Review, 48, 548-566.
Weisskopf, (1992), "Democratic Self-Management: An Alternative Ap-
proach to Economic Transformation in The Former Soviet Union",Working
Paper, Department of Economics, University of Michigan.
Weitzman, M. (1991), "How Not to Privatize", Rivista di Politica Econom-
ica, XII, December.
Williamson, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New
York, Free Press.
7 Appendix
7.1 A dierent specication of the model
Before of presenting the proofs of the dierent propositions and the changes
necessary to introducing into the model the duopolistic market structure, we
sketch here some results obtained by using in the game a dierent specication
of the players'utilities. The idea is which to represent both the aim of the
government to maximize the consumers' surplus (beside the rm's value) and the
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workers' interest in the level of employment (a part from their specic concern
with the per capita value-added). This can be done by representing the two
players' utilities as:
8<:Uk =
0@ QZ
Q=0
p (Q) dQ+  (Q)
1A ; U` = V (Q)  L
9=; : (A1)
so to obtain:
Max
Q
 (Q; ) =   Uk (Q) + (1  )  U` (Q) Q =
= 
 
QR
Q=0
p (Q) dQ+  (Q)
!
+ (1  )

wQ+ (Q)Q Q
 (A2)
whose rst order condition is, by using the specication of the section 4:
0 =
@
 

 
aQ  12Q2 + (a Q)Q  wQ  Ik

+ (1  ) ((a Q)Q  Ik)

@Q
=
=  (2a  3Q  w) + (1  ) ( 2Q+ a)
with solution:
Q () =
a  w + a
 + 2
(A3)
It is immediate to check that the rst part of the lemma 1 also holds for this
specication of the players'utilities (as far as a > 2w):
d

a w+a
+2

d
=
a  2w
( + 2)
2 > 0 (A4)
Thus as far as the public rm is more espansive in term of quantity delivered
in the market than the employee privatized rm, the bargaining solution associ-
ated to the market solution gives rise to results very similar to which presented
in the paper.
7.2 Proof of proposition 1
By constructing the Lagrangean function of the problem (4) the following rst
order condition is obtained:
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@L(;)
@ =
@(Uk((Q)) Uk)
@Q
dQ
d
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

+
@(U`(V (Q)) U`)
@Q 
dQd
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk
    0
  0;   @(Uk((Q
)) Uk)
@Q  dQd
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

+
@(U`(V (Q)) U`)
@Q 
dQd
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk
   = 0
@L(;)
@ = (1  )  0;   0;  (1  ) = 0
(A5)
while the second order condition holds:
@2Uk((Q
))
@Q2
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

+ @
2Ul(V (Q
))
@Q2
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk

+
+2

dUk((Q
))
dQ  dU`(V (Q
))
dQ

< 0
Now, we rst prove part (a) of proposition 1. When  = 0, it follows
from the third expression of FOC (A5) that  = 0, that is, the constraint is not
binding. Then, for  to be the maximum of the problem (4) it is necessary
that, at an equilibrium point:
@(Uk((Q)) Uk)
@Q
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

+
@(U`(V (Q)) U`)
@Q
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk
  0
(A6)
From the lemma 1 we know that when  = 0, @U`(V (Q
))
@Q = 0 and
@Uk((Q
))
@Q >
0: Since
@(Uk((Q)) Uk)
@Q =
@Uk((Q
))
@Q > 0 and
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `
  0 by as-
sumption, the rst term of (A6) can be just greater or equal to zero. Now, look-
ing at the second term of (A6), we know that
@(U`(V (Q)) U`)
@Q =
@U`(V (Q
))
@Q = 0
and then this term is equal to zero. As a consequence, the expression (A6)
can be respected only with the sign of equality. This can happens only when 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

= 0.
Part (b) When  = 1, we obtain from the third expression of FOC (A5)
that  > 0 and then the constraint is binding. Then, for  to be the maximum
of the problem (4) it is necessary that an equilibrium point:
@(Uk((Q)) Uk)
@Q
 
U` (V (Q
))  U `

+
@(U`(V (Q)) U`)
@Q
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk
  0
(A7)
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From the lemma 1 we know that when  = 1 , @Uk((Q
))
@Q = 0 and
@U`(V (Q
))
@Q < 0: Since
@(Uk((Q)) Uk)
@Q =
@Uk((Q
))
@Q = 0 the rst term of (A7)
is equal to zero and the second term is lesser than zero since
@(Ul(V (Q)) U l)
@Q =
@U`(V (Q
))
@Q < 0 . As a consequence, the expression (A7) can be respected only
when
 
Uk ( (Q
))  Uk

= 0. (Q.E.D.)
7.3 The duopolistic framework
Now, we introduce in more detail the duopolistic framework adopted in the
section 4 to yields some comparative statics results.
The main assumption used in the text is that during the bargaining game
the rm 1 (the rm that has to decide about its new ownership status) takes
into account the fact that the output of the competing rm (the rm 2) also
depends on  through the rm's one quantity, that is, q2 = q2 (q1 ()). In this
case, the bargaining game becomes:
Max

N(q1();q2(q1()))=(Uk((q1();q2(q1()))) Uk)(U`(V (q1();q2(q1()))) U`)
s:t: 2[0;1]; UiUi, (i=`;k)
and the rst order condition is:
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@q1
dq1
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

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 
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dq1
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dq1
d



  Uk ( (q1 () ; q2 (q1 ())))  Uk
The results in section 4 are obtained by solving simultaneously the following
equations:8>>><>>>:
 ( 2Q+ a  w) + (1  )  2Q+aQ   (1  )
(a Q)Q 
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Ii
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
=0
for the monopoly,
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for the duopoly with a PMF, and8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
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for the duopoly with a VMF.
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